Decentralization vs Incoordination – Tadge Dryja (MIT DCI)BPASE ’17, January 26th 2017, Stanford UniversityStanford Cyber Initiative
The conference will explore the use of formal methods, empirical analysis, and risk modeling to better understand security and systemic risk in blockchain protocols. The conference aims to foster multidisciplinary collaboration among practitioners and researchers in blockchain protocols, distributed systems, cryptography, computer security, and risk management.
The fact that Bitcoin was designed to confound human decision-making is a feature, not a flaw. The core protocol is tasked with enforcing the single rule most crucial to the cryptocurrency’s value: no counterfeit spending. By contrast, the U.S. dollar is burdened with effecting monetary policy, enforcing sanctions, fighting crime and much more. The more functions a currency has, the more things there are to argue over, and the more likely the community will be to fracture. Bitcoin’s uncompromising focus allows it to serve a broader user base.In blockchains, anarchy is the worst form of governance except for all the others. That said, it’s still possible that Bitcoin didn’t get things right the first time around. As more people get involved, coordinating decisions will become even more difficult, and Bitcoin’s inflexibility may prove too limiting. 1 Even Ethereum, which once executed a $55 million loss recovery on three days’ notice, is finding it difficult to repeat the procedure 18 months later. Any decentralized cryptocurrency has a limited window in which to coordinate decisions. So let the creative experiments begin.
One of the key problems of blockchain technology is lack of control of users, organized societies, and state authorities over the transactions and asset on the decentralized network.
The distributed ledger and blockchain are interesting as an example of new technology, which is the rule not only for users but also for governments. Technology-driven rules can be viewed as a technological law for blockchain users and legislative authorities. No legal regulation can change the anonymity or immutability of blockchain. Only another technology could turn the situation around. This is a lesson for every lawyer to learn not only the law but the scope of technology.
The purpose of the article is an analysis of modern determinants of control distribution over assets, transactions, and decentralized organizations on blockchain distributed network.
The article shows how control appears in a variety of different situations on blockchain network. Examples range from the individual and organizational control to control over the networking system discussing the possibilities of the participants to exercise control.
On the base of the legal cases, the ability of controlling shareholder, directors, managers, governments, stakeholders and users of crypto-communities to control the organization, transactions and assets are discussed.
Keywords: control, blockchain, decentralized organization, virtual organization
This conference aims to explore the relationship between blockchain and governance, offering a space not only for the consideration of how governmental processes may be altered by blockchain technology, but also how governments may in turn shape this technology.
Realizing the Potential of BlockchainA Multistakeholder Approach to the Stewardship of Blockchain and CryptocurrenciesBlockchain, or distributed ledger technology, could soon give rise to a new era of the Internet even more disruptive and transformative than the current one. Blockchain’s ability to generate unprecedented opportunities to create and trade value in society will lead to a generational shift in the Internet’s evolution, from an Internet of Information to a new generation Internet of Value. The key to enabling this transition is the formation of a multistakeholder consensus around how the technology functions, its current and potential applications and how to create the regulatory, cultural and organizational conditions for it to succeed.
In this report, we present an overview of the current landscape of DLT/Blockchain developments and closely examine the issues that are central to the development of DLT/Blockchain. We articulate a set of areas for further consideration by the DLT/Blockchain community regarding the potential role of standardization. Rather than providing a definitive list of topics, the aim of the study is to provoke further discussion across the DLT/Blockchain community about the potential role of standards in supporting the development and adoption of the technology. The research has been carried out using a mixed methods approach involving a focused review of the literature, in-depth interviews with experts from public and private organizations, and an internal workshop.
Governance in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract TheoriesWessel Reijers, Fiachra O’Brolcháin, Paul HaynesAbstractThis paper is placed in the context of a growing number of social and political critiques of blockchain technologies. We focus on the supposed potential of blockchain technologies to transform political institutions that are central to contemporary human societies, such as money, property rights regimes, and systems of democratic governance. Our aim is to examine the way blockchain technologies canbring about – and justify – new models of governance. To do so, we draw on the philosophical works of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Rawls, analyzing blockchain governance in terms of contrasting social contract theories. We begin by comparing the justifications of blockchain governance offered by members of the blockchain developers’ community with the justifications of governance presented within social contract theories. We then examine the extent to which the model of governance offered by blockchain technologies reflects key governance themes and assumptions located within social contract theories, focusing on the notions of sovereignty, the initial situation, decentralization and distributive justice.