people

The Reputation Society – Hassan Masum

Posted in people, related_projects, Research Notes, trust

The Reputation Society (MIT Press, 2012) is a collection of essays discussing the benefits and risks of online reputation. It focuses on asking the right questions today, so that reputation is better used in society tomorrow. Expert contributors offer perspectives ranging from philanthropy and open access to science and law. The 18 chapters are divided into 6 thematic parts. (The Table of Contents, sample chapters, and reviews are on the Reputation Society MIT Press web page.)

Source: The Reputation Society – Hassan Masum

New Blockchain Forensics Tool Developed Through French-Austrian Cooperation

Posted in cybercrime, finance, people, quantitative analysis, Research Notes

The French cybersecurity company Nigma Conseil and the Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT) have revealed to have collaborated on developing a new blockchain forensics tool. The agreement was signed on Feb. 25 to work on e-Nigma, a proposed compliance tool.E-Nigma provides its users with a way of conducting due diligence investigations in response to Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulation. Like other similar tools, it monitors and organizes blockchain transactions.The platform provides several advanced features such as risk scoring and wallet clustering. It is able to identify addresses with real-life identities by scraping through both the clear and dark web. It builds on the open-source cryptocurrency forensics platform provided by AIT, GraphSense. AIT is a government-owned research institute headquartered in Vienna. The technology was built as part of an AIT-led program called TITANIUM, which was formed to investigate transactions in “underground markets.” The program was awarded a 5 million euro ($5.4 million) grant by the European Union to mitigate cryptocurrency crime.Fabien Tabarly, CEO of NIGMA Conseil, commented on the collaboration: “The synergy between a leading European academic research institute and our team of developers has been instrumental in implementing the most innovative tools to fight financial crime in virtual currencies.”Blockchain forensicsE-Nigma is working in a competitive field, with similar solutions being provided by companies like Chainalysis, Elliptic and CipherTrace. As money laundering regulations around the world turn more stringent, many companies in the cryptocurrency and traditional finance sectors are turning to blockchain forensics tools. Chainalysis recently announced its collaboration with both Bitfinex and Tether, helping the service provider maintain compliance.Elliptic has turned its focus on banks, with a compliance tool letting them understand the true risk from cryptocurrency exchange transactions.

Source: New Blockchain Forensics Tool Developed Through French-Austrian Cooperation

Towards a Theory of Digital Network De/centralization: Platform-Infrastructure Lessons Drawn from Blockchain by Enrico Rossi, Carsten Sørensen :: SSRN

Posted in decentralization, papers, people, Research Notes

Global digital platforms are conquering the world and rely critically on digital infrastructures to function, yet little research has explored the fundamental interrelationship between the two. This working paper argues that understanding centralization and decentralization in digital networks as asymmetry and symmetry in mutual interdependencies between the constitutive elements of a digital network can help us understand the platform-infrastructure relationship more fundamentally (and vice versa). To this end, the paper proposes, as a starting point, the in-depth analytical and literature study of blockchain networks as a particularly revealing type of digital platform/infrastructure duality. The paper proposes an analytical model for characterizing de/centralization in digital networks and maps this onto blockchain networks. Based on this, the paper explores the de/centralization of blockchain, arguing that the extant blockchain literature largely has failed in providing a comprehensive understanding of de/centralization by not considering the complex second-order interdependencies between the different constitutive dimensions of a blockchain: the symbolic, technological and political dimension. Based on this, the paper provides an analysis of the meaning of de/centralization in blockchain networks by studying the interdependencies between its constitutive elements of coin, network technology, and social community.

Source: Towards a Theory of Digital Network De/centralization: Platform-Infrastructure Lessons Drawn from Blockchain by Enrico Rossi, Carsten Sørensen :: SSRN

Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies? A Framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations by Philipp Hacker :: SSRN

Posted in blockchain, governance, papers, people, Research Notes

Abstract

Cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin or ethereum are gaining ground not only as alternative modes of payment, but also as platforms for financial innovation, particularly through token sales (ICOs). All of these ventures are based on decentralized, permissionless blockchain technology whose distinguishing characteristics are their openness to, and the formal equality of, participants. However, recent cryptocurrency crises have shown that these architectures lack robust governance frameworks and are therefore prone to patterns of re-centralization: they are informally dominated by coalitions of powerful players within the cryptocurrency ecosystem who may violate basic rules of the blockchain community without accountability or sanction.

Against this background, this paper makes two novel contributions. First, it suggests that cryptocurrency and token-based ecosystems can be fruitfully analyzed as complex systems that have been studied for decades in complexity theory and that have recently gained prominence in financial regulation, too. It applies these insights to three key case studies: the Bitcoin Hard Fork of 2013; the Ethereum hard fork of 2016, following the DAO hack; and the ongoing Bitcoin scaling debate. Second, the paper argues that complexity-induced uncertainty can be reduced, and elements of stability and order strengthened, by adapting a corporate governance framework to blockchain-based organizations: cryptocurrencies, and decentralized applications built on top of them via token sales. Most importantly, the resulting “comply or explain” approach combines transparency and accountability with the necessary flexibility that allows cryptocurrency developers to continue to experiment for the sake of innovation. Eventually, however, the coordination of these activities may necessitate the establishment of an “ICANN for blockchains”.

Keywords: blockchain; token sales; ICO; initial coin offering; governance; corporation; bitcoin; ethereum; hard fork; utility token; investment token; complexity theory; ICANN; hard fork

Source: Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies? A Framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations by Philipp Hacker :: SSRN

A curated list of awesome resources for Cryptoeconomics research

Posted in economics, people, Research Notes

Awesome Cryptoeconomics 

A curated list of awesome resources for Cryptoeconomics research

Looking for contributors. Submit a pull request if you have something to add 🙂

Please check the contribution guidelines for info on formatting and writing pull requests.

Table of Contents

Articles

Introductory

  1. Cryptoeconomics for dummies
  2. Cryptoeconomics 101
  3. Making Sense of Cryptoeconomics Making Sense of Cryptoeconomics by Josh Stark
  4. What is Cryptoeconomics What is Cryptoeconomics, a guide by BlockGeeks
  5. How Society Will Be Transformed By Cryptoeconomics
  6. Paving the Future of Blockchain Technology
  7. Vivek Singh’s Cryptoeconomics in context
  8. Cryptoeconomics Definitions Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3
  9. The Blockchain Economy: A beginner’s guide to institutional cryptoeconomics by RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub
  10. Cryptoeconomics is Hard Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3 by Aleksandr Bulkin
  11. How to create a cryptoeconomic protocol from scratch by Vlad Zamfir
  12. Behavioural Crypto-Economics the challenge and promise of Blockchain Incentive Design by Elad Verbin
  13. Introduction to Blockchain through Cryptoeconomics by Zubin Koticha
  14. The need for an Incentive scheme in Algorand by Alexis Guaba, Zubin Koticha
  15. Cryptoeconomics.study — An free and open source book & course on Cryptoeconomics

Game Theory

  1. Introduction to Game Theory Part one of a series by Devin Soni
  2. Schelling Point Introduction to the concept of Schelling Point
  3. Nash Equilibria and Schelling Points
  4. The strategy of conflict book The Strategy of Conflict
  5. Mechanism design (deck) Mechanism design theory examples and complexity
  6. Standford’s Algorithmic Game Theory lecture series
  7. Cryptocurrency Game Theory What is Cryptocurrency Game Theory: A Basic introduction
  8. Correlated Equilibria In Game Theory, No Clear Path to Equilibrium

Mechanism Design

  1. A Crash Course in Mechanism Design for Cryptoeconomic Applications
  2. Mechanism Theory paper by Matthew O. Jackson
  3. Mechanism Design Theory

Cryptographic Primitives

  1. Cryptographic Primitives as described in Wikipedia
  2. A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography by Dan Boneh and Victor Shoup
  3. Ethereum: Signing and Validating
  4. Merkling in Ethereum by Vitalik Buterin
  5. Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree by Arvind Narayanan and Jeremy Clark

Consensus Mechanisms

PoW – Proof of Work

  1. PoW and Blockchains presentation by Prof. Ittay Eyal (IC3)
  2. The PoW concept article by the Nakamoto Institute
  3. ConsensusPedia – An Encylopedia of 29 consensus algorithms article by the Nakamoto Institute) article by Vasa
  4. Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake by BlockGeeks
  5. Vulnerability: Proof of Work vs. Proof of Stake

PoS – Proof of Stake

  1. Strengths and Weaknesses of PoS Vitalik Buterin’s article on the strengths and weaknesses of staking contrasting to PoW algorithms
  2. PoS Design Philosophy A Proof of Stake Design Philosophy by Vitalik Buterin
  3. Ethereum PoS FAQ
  4. The evolution of PoS Article on the evolution of PoS by Coin Telegraph
  5. Weak Subjectivity in PoS Weak Subjectivity in PoS by Vitalik Buterin
  6. The History of Casper – Chapter 1 Vlad Zamfir’s series on the history of Casper, Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5
  7. On Stake and Consensus
  8. Critic on the PoS Philosophy by Tuur Demeester
  9. Extended Summary on Casper by Jon Choi
  10. The Economics of the PoS consensus algorithm
  11. Casper vs Tendermint
  12. Minimal Slashing condition in Ethereum

DPoS – Delegated Proof of Stake

  1. DPoS Introduction Introduction to DPoS by Bitshares
  2. DPoS vs PoW Article by Daniel Larimer from Bitshares
  3. Tendermint BFT vs. EOS dPoS by Tendermint
  4. Seeking Consensus on Consensus Delegated Proof of Stake and the Two Generals’ Problem

dBFT – Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance

  1. Byzantine Fault Tolerance in Distributed Systems by Prof. Kenneth Goodwin
  2. dBFT vs PoW and PoS Antshare’s (now NEO) views on consensus
  3. Intro to Ethermint BFT

Network Effects

  1. A Note on Metcalfe’s Law, Externalities and Ecosystem Splits by Vitalik Buterin
  2. Continuous Token Models: Towards a Million Networks of Value by Simon de la Rouviere
  3. Crypto Tokens: A breakthrough in open network design by Chris Dixon
  4. Bitcoin Network Effects
  5. Keepers — Workers that Maintain Blockchain Networks
  6. Smart-Contract Network Effect Fallacy

Governance

  1. The Consensus Series, Part I: The Basics of Collectivity and Addendum by Aleksandr Bulkin
  2. Governance and Network Effects
  3. Notes on Blockchain Governance by Vitalik Buterin
  4. Against On-Chain Governance by Vlad Zamfir
  5. [On Public vs Private Blockchains]https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/) by Vitalik Buterin

Cryptoeconomic Security

  1. Intro to Cryptoeconomic security Basic intro to cryptoeconomic security
  2. Anti-fragile Cryptoeconomic systems Anti-fragile cryptoeconomic Systems through game theory
  3. Triangle of harm by Vitalik Buterin
  4. On Inflation, Transaction Fees and Cryptocurrency Monetary Policy Vitalik Buterin’s article on the role of cryptoeconomics in blockchain security
  5. Settlement Finality Vitalik Buterin’s article on the elusive topic of economic finality
  6. Bancor is flawed Bancor’s review by Hacking Distributed
  7. To sink front-runners, send submarines Bancor’s front-running woes by Hacking Distributed
  8. Bitcoin’s security model by Jameson Lopp

Attacks

  1. General article on how attacks work in PoW – Part 1 and Part 2
  2. Long range attacks
  3. Censorship attacks
  4. P + epsilon attack
  5. Coordination problems
  6. The Miners dilemma
  7. Dealing with failure in cryptocurrency Vlad Zamfir’s article on dealing with failure in cryptocurrency
  8. Model of an internal PoW attacker Vlad Zamfir’s article on PoW attackers
  9. Cryptoeconomics and X-Risk researchers should listen to each other more Vitalik Buterin’s article on how cryptoeconomics and existential risk researchers could apply blockchain technology in global coordination challenges Part 2
  10. Presentation on most common attacks in Bitcoin
  11. 51% Attack Bitcoin.it Wiki explanation
  12. Selfish Mining a 25% attack against Bitcoin
  13. Sybil attack as described in Wikipedia
  14. Nothing at Stake and Long-range attacks in PoS
  15. $5 wrench Attack XKCD comic on the cheapest attack on cryptography
  16. An Exploration of Attack Vectors in Proof-of-Stake Mechanism Labs

Token Engineering

  1. The Emergence of Cryptoeconomic Primitives
  2. History Is Rhyming: Fitness Functions & Comparing Blockchain Tokens To The Web by Simon de la Rouviere
  3. Introducing Curation Markets: Trade Popularity of Memes & Information by Simon de la Rouviere
  4. Can Blockchains Go Rogue? by Trent McConaghy
  5. Towards a Practice of Token Engineering, with presentation deck here by Trent McConaghy
  6. Token Engineering Case Studies Analysis of Bitcoin, Design of Ocean Protocol by Trent McConaghy

Cryptoeconomic Primitives

  1. The Emergence of Cryptoeconomic Primitives by Jacob Horne
  2. Token Curated Registries 1.0 by Mike Goldin
  3. Continuous Token-Curated Registries: The Infinity of Lists by Simon de la Rouviere
  4. Tokens 2.0: Curved Token Bonding in Curation Markets by Simon de la Rouviere
  5. Solving Price Discovery Of Non-Rivalrous Goods (with Curved Bonding) by Simon de la Rouviere
  6. Hashtag Markets by Simon de la Rouviere
  7. How to Make Bonding Curves for Continuous Token Models
  8. Re-Fungible Token (RFT) by Billy Rennekamp

Tokenomics

  1. Token sales models Token sales models by Vitalik Buterin
  2. A business guide to Tokenomics by William Mougayar
  3. Cryptoasset Valuations by Chris Burniske
  4. Justified Token Value by Adrian Jonklaas
  5. Understanding Token Velocity
  6. On Value, Velocity and Monetary Theory
  7. The Token Classification Framework a multi-dimensional tool for understanding and classifying crypto tokens
  8. MV = PQ isn’t right for crypto a case made by Austere Capital
  9. The quantitative theory of money for tokens a rebuttal of the MV = PQ theory by Warren Weber
  10. NVT – network value to transactions ratio a market to transaction value proposal by Coinmetrics

Stablecoins

  1. Ethereum Madrid’s Cryptoeconomics 101 presentation on Stablecoins by Sandra Becker of Ethereum Madrid
  2. An Overview of stablecoins
  3. Stablecoins: A Holy Grail in digital cryptocurrencies
  4. Volatility and Mass Adoption: 2 reasons we would benefit from a stablecoin
  5. The search for a stable cryptocurrency
  6. An Experiment with Sai, a simple stablecoin by MakedDAO
  7. Maker for Dummies: A Plain English Explanation of the Dai Stablecoin
  8. Designing a price stable currency by Haseeb Qureshi
  9. A skeptic view of stablecoins

State Channels

  1. Compact and very well explained definition
  2. Overview on the Raiden Network
  3. Generalised State Channels on Ethereum
  4. Introducing multi-party state-channels
  5. A state-channels adventure with Counterfactual Rick by SpankChain (SFW!)

Empirical Cryptoeconomics

  1. How manipulation-resistant are Prediction Markets? How manipulation-resistant are Prediction Markets? Our Undertaking in Empirical Cryptoeconomics by Gnosis
  2. Empirical Cryptoeconomics Vitalik Buterin’s post on empirical cryptoeconomics
  3. Testing mechanism design with AI agents Tool for Smart Contract testing with concept paper and intro

Videos

Consensus Protocols

  1. Consensus Consensus Algorithm – Andreas Antonopoulos
  2. Intro to Casper Karl Floersch presenting Ethereum’s Casper PoS
  3. PoS roundtable PoS roundtable with Joseph Poon, Vitalik Buterin, Vlad Zamfir, Dominic Williams, Zack Hess at Cryptoeconomicon 2015
  4. PoW roundtable PoW roundtable with Tim Swanson, Vitalik Buterin and Peter Todd at Cryptoeconomicon 2015
  5. Proof of Stake – Technion Cyber and Computer Security Summer School and presentation deck
  6. CESC2017 – Casper Proof of Stake
  7. Hangout – Ethereum PoS: Casper FFG In Depth and the presentation
  8. Hangout – Ethereum PoS: Casper & Smart Contract Consensus Overview and the presentation deck

Cryptoeconomics

  1. Game Theory in Bitcoin Game Theory approach behind the motivation for Bitcoin mining
  2. CESC2017 – Cryptoeconomics in Casper
  3. What is Cryptoeconomics Vlad Zamfir introducing Cryptoeconomics
  4. Introduction to Cryptoeconomics Vitalik Buterin introducing Cryptoeconomics. The corresponding presentation deck is available here
  5. Hard problems in Cryptoeconomics Vitalik Buterin discussing hard problems with cryptoeconomics
  6. The Cryptoeconomic way Vitalik Buterin discussing cryptoeconomics.
  7. Cryptoeconomic Protocols In the Context of Wider Society Vitalik Buterin discussing cryptoeconomics. The corresponding presentation deck is available here
  8. The current state of Cryptoeconomics The current state of Cryptoeconomics by Vlad Zamfir
  9. Programmable Incentives by Karl Floersch at Devcon 3
  10. Hard problems in cryptoeconomics by Vitalik Buterin
  11. Cryptoeconomic Primitives
  12. Global Scale Research Networks and Cryptoeconomics
  13. Towards a Practice of Token Engineering by Trent McConaghy
  14. Cryptoeconomic Theory an on-going series by Viktor Makarskyy with part 1, part 2, part 3 and part 4

State Channels

  1. The Raiden Network, a technical introduction
  2. Short introduction to the The Raiden Network by Lefteris Karapetsas
  3. State Channels explained in detail by Ameen Soleimani

Cryptoeconomic Security

  1. The costs of hacking Bitcoin Sybil attacks explained
  2. Game theory and Network Attacks- How to destroy Bitcoin by by Max Fang 03/2017
  3. Game theory and Network Attacks- How to destroy Bitcoin by Nadir Akhtar and Aparna Krishnan 11/2017
  4. 51% Attacks: Pools and Game Theory
  5. Nothing at stake Introducing the nothing at stake attack
  6. Security Considerations of the Casper Protocol Vlad Zamfir at Standford’s Blockchain Protocol Analysis and Security Engineering 2017

Cryptography

  1. Cryptography for Cryptocurrency
  2. Bitcoin – Cryptographic hash functions
  3. Hashed based signatures An illustrated primer

Additional

  1. BBC Documentary Adam Curtis’ “Fuck you buddy” BBC documentary

Podcasts

  1. Q&A on Casper Vlad Zamfir answering questions regarding Ethereum’s Casper PoS
  2. PoW attacks Podcast from 2015 on PoW attacks
  3. Cryptoeconomics, Stablecoins, Casper with Vlad Zamfir, and corresponding transcript is available here
  4. Fintech Podcast – Episode 151 Cryptoeconomics as explained by Dr Chris Berg
  5. Cryptoeconomic Primitives by Trent McConaghy

Whitepapers

  1. Bitcoin Whitepaper
  2. Ethereum Whitepaper
  3. Blockchain Consensus Protocols in the Wild
  4. dBFT Whitepaper The Quest for Scalable Blockchain Fabric: Proof-of-Work vs. BFT Replication by IBM Research
  5. Federated Byzantine Agreements by Stellar Development Foundation’s David Mazieres
  6. Research Paper on PoS vs. Pow by Bitfury
  7. Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer
  8. Game Theory approach behind Bitcoin mining
  9. Research Paper on the security model in PoW by ETH Zurich and others
  10. A Note on Limits on Incentive Compatibility and Griefing Factors
  11. Research Paper on eclipse attacks on the Bitcoin Network
  12. Research Paper on eclipse attacks on the Ethereum Network
  13. Research paper on hashrate-based double spend attack
  14. Satoshi Risk Tables
  15. MakerDAO Purple Paper
  16. Sweetbridge Liquidity Protocol
  17. Bancor Protocol
  18. Maker Dai Stablecoin
  19. Curation Markets by Simon de la Rouviere
  20. The Economics of BitCoin Price Formation This paper analyses the relationship between BitCoin price and supply-demand fundamentals of Bitcoin
  21. A Cost of Production Model for Bitcoin
  22. The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol Analysis and Applications
  23. Cryptocurrencies without PoW
  24. Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain

Other Resources

  1. Casper PoS Discourse Ethereum Foundation’s Discourse channel on Casper
  2. Evolution of Trust Fun interactive game by Nicky Case showing the evolution of group trust over time
  3. Formal verification on Casper Formal verification on Casper
  4. Ethresear.ch Casper research topic
  5. CECS – CryptoEconomics Security Conference
  6. Reddit subgroup
  7. Telegram Group
  8. RIAT – Institute for Future Cryptoeconomics a research group from Austria
  9. Cryptoeconomics Asia is an independent research firm
  10. Cryptoeconomics at RMIT University a research group of economists in Australia
  11. Research Institute for Cryptoeconomics Vienna University of Economics and Business
  12. MIT Cryptoeconomics Lab MIT’s first cryptoeconomics lab

Blockchain Hacks and Post-mortems

The DAO

  1. The DAO can turn into a naturally arising Ponzi prescient article by Hacking Distributed
  2. Analysis of the DAO Exploit by Hacking Distributed
  3. Thoughts on the DAO hack by Hacking Distributed

Parity MultiSig

  1. Parity’s Post-mortem
  2. Deep dive into the Parity hack

Bancor

  1. Front-running Bancor in 150 lines of Python

King of Ether

  1. King of Ether Post-mortem

Roulette

  1. Attacking a public RNG article by Martin Swende on attacking a smart contract that used a public Random Number Generator

Additional information and related topics

Behavioural Economics

  1. BE Ted Talk Prof. Dan Ariely’s Ted Talk on Behavioural Economics
  2. Predictably Irrational book Predictably Irrational by Prof. Dan Ariely
  3. The Honest Truth About Dishonesty book The Honest Truth About Dishonesty by Prof. Dan Ariely

Economics

  1. Awesome Economics

Cryptography

  1. Awesome Cryptography

MIT Cryptoeconomics Lab

Posted in people, related_projects, Research Notes

The objective of the MIT Cryptoeconomics Lab is to push the research frontier in the emerging field of cryptoeconomics.

Cryptoeconomics brings together the fields of economics and computer science to study the decentralized marketplaces and applications that can be built by combining cryptography with economic incentives.

It focuses on individual decision-making and strategic interaction between different participants in a digital ecosystem (e.g. users, providers of key resources, application developers etc.), and uses methodologies from the field of economics – such as game theory, mechanism design and causal inference – to understand how to fund, design, develop, facilitate the operations and encourage the adoption of decentralized marketplaces and related services and digital assets.

The resulting “digital economies” often require the definition of a monetary, fiscal, privacy and innovation policy. Moreover, they need effective governance to ensure that the platform maintainers can upgrade the underlying software protocols over time in response to changes in the environment, technology or market needs.

Brock Pierce: The Hippie King of Cryptocurrency – Rolling Stone

Posted in bitcoin, blockchain, discourse, identity, issues/conflicts, nonsense, people, politics, Research Notes

Pierce, meanwhile, was about to try to repeat his success in e-sports when people began mentioning cryptocurrency to him roughly a year after the first Bitcoins were mined. Pierce was shocked that he’d never heard of it. “There were no storytellers who knew how to convey the information in simple insights, so it required a lot of real heavy lifting to figure out,” he says. “I didn’t have the time to appreciate the power of decentralization at first. The day I got it, I knew that was it.”Bannon recently took a leap into cryptocurrency as well, not just because of its financial implications, but because of its political ones. “This whole populist revolt is going to come down to this concept of currency,” he says. “You can see the forces that are aligned to take advantage of it. Every smart person that I admire in the world, and those I semi-fear, is focused on this concept of crypto for a reason. They understand that this is the driving force of the fourth industrial revolution: steam engine, electricity, then the microchip – blockchain and crypto is the fourth. There’s going to be a war for control for this.”Once Pierce caught on to the potential of this new digital cash, he became an evangelist, giving away Bitcoins to everyone he could, whether to an influencer or to the audience at one of his talks. He eventually stopped giving the money away because “no one appreciated it, then they lost it, and it was a waste of my fucking time. I get messages all the time from people saying, ‘I think of how much I lost because I didn’t take it seriously.’ ”

Source: Brock Pierce: The Hippie King of Cryptocurrency – Rolling Stone

Blockchain Economics | Markus K. Brunnermeier

Posted in blockchain, economics, papers, people, Research Notes

When is record-keeping better arranged through distributed ledger technology (DLT) than through a traditional centralized intermediary? The ideal qualities of any record-keeping system are (i) correctness, (ii) decentralization, and (iii) cost efficiency. We point out a \textit{Blockchain Trilemma}: no ledger can satisfy all three properties simultaneously. A centralized ledger writer extracts rents due to its monopoly on the ledger. Its franchise value dynamically incentivizes honest reporting. Decentralized ledgers provide static incentives for honesty through computationally expensive Proof-of-Work algorithms but eliminate rents through “fork competition.” Portability of information between “forks” and competition among miners fosters competition among decentralized ledgers that is fiercer than traditional competition. However, fork competition can engender instability and miscoordination. While blockchains can keep track of ownership transfers, enforcement of possession rights is still needed in many blockchain applications.

Source: Blockchain Economics | Markus K. Brunnermeier

European countries join Blockchain Partnership | Digital Single Market

Posted in blockchain, people, politics, Research Notes

23 European countries have signed a Declaration on the establishment of a European Blockchain Partnership. The Partnership will be a vehicle for cooperation amongst Member States to exchange experience and expertise in technical and regulatory fields and prepare for the launch of EU-wide blockchain applications across the Digital Single Market for the benefit of the public and private sectors. This should ensure that Europe continues to play a leading role in the development and roll-out of blockchain technologies.

Source: European countries join Blockchain Partnership | Digital Single Market